tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post2250862172472038139..comments2023-06-18T01:25:08.748-07:00Comments on Information Transfer Economics: Falsifiability isn't empirical validityJason Smithhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-69718700286389838932016-01-12T17:00:15.135-08:002016-01-12T17:00:15.135-08:00I was curious about Sean Carroll's take: [1], ...I was curious about Sean Carroll's take: <a href="http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/01/14/what-scientific-ideas-are-ready-for-retirement/" rel="nofollow">[1]</a>, <a href="http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2014/01/sean-carroll-edge-and-falsifiability.html" rel="nofollow">[2]</a>Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-50544573244148786592016-01-12T10:03:45.649-08:002016-01-12T10:03:45.649-08:00You said:
"That is, hypotheses of events and...You said:<br /><br />"That is, hypotheses of events and phenomena may be falsified much as they are in the social sciences, but hypothesized mechanisms are not so clear cut ..."<br /><br />I completely agree with this. There is often more than one way to come to a specific result. A good example is economist Gary Becker's derivation of demand curves using irrational agents versus the standard way using utility functions and optimizing agents (see <a href="http://informationtransfereconomics.blogspot.com/2015/10/gary-beckers-emergent-rational-agents.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>).Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-236622630413508952016-01-12T09:59:42.561-08:002016-01-12T09:59:42.561-08:00After reading more from Popper, I am coming around...After reading more from Popper, I am coming around to a view that he a) didn't really understand science as it operates and b) was ambiguous.<br /><br />Popper expressed a view that if something had more empirical content (more accurate than other theories), then it was a better theory. In your discussion, that would seem to point to not "throwing Newton out" because the alternative was the even less accurate Ptolemaic/Aristotelian model. Newton stays even though it has a bad observation regarding the orbit of Uranus.<br /><br />But Popper also seems to express a view that one bad observation "falsified" a theory.<br /><br />This is incoherent. In one scenario you have degrees of "truth" (relative empirical accuracy); in the other you have a binary.<br /><br />Operationally, science has been conducted -- even in Popper's time -- with degrees of truth. Some models are better than others, but only at given approximations under different domains of applicability. Thermodynamics breaks the time symmetry of Newtonian physics so that observations of nature seem to prefer a direction of time "falsifying" Newtonian physics and it's time reversal symmetry. But time reversal is a good symmetry at the micro scale, while entropy is important at the macro scale.<br /><br />A binary "truth/falsified" would mean all theories are falsified and should be thrown out. Even the standard model of physics -- the most accurate things known by humans are calculated with it -- is falsified because neutrinos appear to have mass.<br /><br />General relativity, one of Popper's favorite examples, is inconsistent with quantum mechanics and is therefore "false" if we have to choose a binary.<br /><br />That makes me think that Popper, if confronted with these facts, would take a less binary view.<br /><br />It's true that is interpretation, but it is interpretation of something that would otherwise be incoherent.Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-90693774614782206042016-01-11T14:09:06.253-08:002016-01-11T14:09:06.253-08:00Geologists and biologists definitely consider scop...Geologists and biologists definitely consider scope: evolution and various geological processes take place over the course of tens of thousands (ice ages) to millions of years. Different kinds of selection pressures operate over different time scales.<br /><br />Chemistry might be considered physics with a specific scope -- at certain temperatures (high, and low), chemistry becomes more physics (nucleosythesis, bose-einstein condensation).Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-88268677603129180512016-01-11T13:30:01.460-08:002016-01-11T13:30:01.460-08:00"Everything should be a question of scope!&qu..."Everything should be a question of scope!"<br /><br />Is scope a bigger issue in physics than in some other sciences? Do biologists, geologists, neuroscientists, geneticists, chemists, climatologists, etc. also contend with scope issues? Or do some of those other scientific fields limit their scope by their very nature? I'd imagine physics to be the king of scope issues: dealing with problems on the extremes of scale, time, force, etc.Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-58224795121237923122016-01-11T13:08:12.849-08:002016-01-11T13:08:12.849-08:00"that everything that is not science is just ..."that everything that is not science is just fooling people: politics, religion, art ... :)" ... Lol, yes, well that's not to say that fooling people isn't of value. It can be the basis of a profitable business and many satisfied customers.Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-21313489244620671072016-01-11T12:42:31.862-08:002016-01-11T12:42:31.862-08:00It is a good one, except a singular "you"...It is a good one, except a singular "you" shouldn't be doing the theory and the empirical data all by yourself. "Don't fool people" is better ... which means that everything that is not science is just fooling people: politics, religion, art ... :)Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-47674742332247511672016-01-11T12:37:23.279-08:002016-01-11T12:37:23.279-08:00There are a few kinds of error in science: systema...There are a few kinds of error in science: systematic, random, model error, etc. Only random errors are considered noise. The others do not average to zero. The errors in the orbits were model errors ... i.e. the model was valid up to terms on the order of Rsun/Rneptune (both R's measured from Uranus; Neptune was effectively assumed to be infinitely far away). A model that makes the assumption that Neptune is infinitely far away is not as empirically accurate as one that doesn't.<br /><br />Another way to look at it: the differences could not have been observed until better clocks had been developed. The invention of better clocks (a historical event) has nothing to do with the question of falsifiability of Newton's theory of gravity (a philosophical question about the nature of science).<br /><br />Everything should be a question of scope! Economics is weird because it <i>ignores</i> questions of scope.Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-575288125757330892016-01-11T12:18:25.965-08:002016-01-11T12:18:25.965-08:00I don't think that the questions about the orb...I don't think that the questions about the orbits of Uranus and Mercury were simply those of empirical accuracy. They arose because there were predictable violations of expected empirical error. They had already gone beyond the question of accuracy. The phenomena were not considered noise.<br /><br />If everything is a question of scope, we get economics. Pick your model. ;)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-81027802336355204922016-01-11T11:18:30.731-08:002016-01-11T11:18:30.731-08:00Magpie has another in the series here.Magpie has <a href="http://aussiemagpie.blogspot.com/2016/01/popper-and-coelacanth.html" rel="nofollow">another in the series here.</a>Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-56747962395285366332016-01-11T10:01:44.352-08:002016-01-11T10:01:44.352-08:00Correction:
*"That is, hypotheses of events ...Correction:<br /><br />*"That is, hypotheses of events and phenomena may be falsified much <b>in the social sciences</b> as they are in the <b>natural</b> sciences..."Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-59416708424096107402016-01-11T09:59:46.460-08:002016-01-11T09:59:46.460-08:00Falsification has nothing to do with a theory bein...<i>Falsification has nothing to do with a theory being "falsified" or its empirical validity.</i><br /><br />True. I stepped too far out into the bailey and conflated the practical matter with the logical form. Good catch.<br /><br />That said, I do believe the problem of closure to be important when we're considering the parameters of falsifiability. Because of the problem of experimental closure in the former, one can virtually always explain divergent outcomes in terms of exogenous causality without ever challenging the theory, in effect rendering it unfalsifiable without it strictly following that the theory in question is pseudoscientific. That is, hypotheses of events and phenomena may be falsified much as they are in the social sciences, but hypothesized <i>mechanisms</i> are not so clear cut -- and it is these one must seek out to find the "law-like" aspects of social life, in which Popper did indeed profess an interest. In this case, the falsifiability criterion by itself contradicts his ostensible aims, as illustrated by his preference for instrumentalism.<br /><br />The most generous reading would probably say the above holds because the inquiry preserves the logical quality of being testable despite the practical difficulties of ever realizing this. But to my mind that just shunts the tension out of falsifiability and into the "falsifiability and trial-and-error" dyad in general, without addressing the practical implications for a doctrine of unity of method.<br /><br />I do agree that the dual- (or even triple-, such as in your articulation) criteria reading is nevertheless far more palatable than the one that holds falsifiability as "necessary and sufficient" by itself. (Unfortunately, per the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/pseudo-science/#KarPop" rel="nofollow">passage I linked,</a> he's not always crystal clear on this point.)Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-77620190291317227162016-01-10T20:45:11.664-08:002016-01-10T20:45:11.664-08:00"However, I don't think that is what Popp...<i>"However, I don't think that is what Popper is about.</i><br /><br />That's a matter of opinion, I suppose. In support of your point of view, I'll say that Popper, like many other thinkers. has his interpreters. Some may have a more generous and flexible interpretation.<br /><br />But I've seen many speaking on his authority, expressing what I call the Queen of Hearts Philosophy of Science: off with their heads at one strike.<br /><br /><i>"Newtonian theory makes a bad prediction for Uranus without Neptune and Popper has his answer: Newtonian theory is falsifiable. In a sense Popper doesn't care what scientists do with their theory anymore. The theory is falsifiable and that's good enough for him. It qualifies as science.<br /><br />"Scientists are concerned with the empirical accuracy of the theory, but probably wouldn't throw Newton out -- there are all the successes for the other planets, the moons of Jupiter and various comets."</i><br /><br />Here I am afraid I'll disagree. For Popper, a falsified theory, once falsified, cannot be justified. To justify a predictive failure by ad hoc means, according to Popper, renders the theory unfalsifiable.<br /><br />But justify Newton/Keppler is precisely what Le Verrier and Couch Adams did (rightly, in my opinion): they did not "throw Newton out" without first trying to find a reason for its apparent failure. And, as it turns out, they were right and there really was a very good reason for its "failure": Neptune.Magpiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07528637318288802178noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-8819546736059088562016-01-10T19:19:11.376-08:002016-01-10T19:19:11.376-08:00Hello Magpie,
I think I understand better what yo...Hello Magpie,<br /><br />I think I understand better what you were trying to say given your last paragraph above. I think it would be better characterized as extreme adherence to empirical accuracy ... only perfectly accurate theories are accepted.<br /><br />However, I don't think that is what Popper is about. Newtonian theory makes a bad prediction for Uranus without Neptune and Popper has his answer: Newtonian theory is falsifiable. In a sense Popper doesn't care what scientists do with their theory anymore. The theory is falsifiable and that's good enough for him. It qualifies as science.<br /><br />Scientists are concerned with the empirical accuracy of the theory, but probably wouldn't throw Newton out -- there are all the successes for the other planets, the moons of Jupiter and various comets.<br /><br />Popper wasn't concerned with empirical accuracy; he was concerned with pseudoscience evading all questions of empirical accuracy. He would be fine with science using an empirically inaccurate theory.Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-45185870627125686762016-01-10T17:41:30.188-08:002016-01-10T17:41:30.188-08:00"I don't recall any violations of these p...<i>"I don't recall any violations of these principles measured at the time, so I am not certain what evidence was falsifying Newton's or Kepler's laws".</i><br /><br />I wrote that post. That is explained in the post linked to in the text (link added below).<br /><br />In a nutshell: after the discovery of Uranus, astronomers calculated its orbit. However, they found there was a systematic and increasing discrepancy between Uranus' actual <i><b>observed</b></i> position and the corresponding <i><b>prediction</b></i>.<br /><br />At the time three main explanations were advanced to that:<br /><br />(1) Perhaps gravity, at such great distances, operated in a manner slightly different to what Newton described;<br />(2) Maybe the predictions were based on observations containing systematic measurement errors;<br />(3) A yet undiscovered planet could be perturbing Uranus' orbit.<br /><br />No quantum effects were considered or could have been considered, as you rightly note. <br /><br />Alternative (1) is tantamount to the falsification of Newton/Kepler. (2) and (3) could be understood as ad hoc justifications to the Newton/Kepler "failure".<br /><br />John Couch Adams and Urbain Le Verrier chose to investigate (3). They calculated the orbit of the still hypothetical planet perturbing Uranus' orbit and commissioned the observatories at Greenwich and Berlin, respectively, to conduct the search.<br /><br />Berlin found the planet (later named Neptune) in the place Le Verrier indicated: the so-called "ad hoc" explanation was right. If astronomers had rushed to embrace (1) -- as extreme Popperians would have advised, had one been present -- an unfair doubt would have been cast on Newton/Keppler and the discovery of Neptune would have been delayed, at least.<br /><br />Incidentally, a similar story was behind the discovery of Pluto.<br /><br />The whole story is here:<br />http://aussiemagpie.blogspot.com/2010/10/observation-vs-deduction.html<br /><br />Cheers.Magpiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07528637318288802178noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-15861453900735143602016-01-10T11:47:39.647-08:002016-01-10T11:47:39.647-08:00Thanks Jason.Thanks Jason.Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-194531817082829022016-01-10T11:43:55.523-08:002016-01-10T11:43:55.523-08:00I really like the "don't fool yourself&q...I really like the "don't fool yourself" concept for a prime directive of science. That covers falsifiability, empirical validity and scope conditions, doesn't it? There may be valid criticisms of Popper, but "don't fool yourself" seems pretty bullet proof. Wherever beings [do/will do/have done] science It's hard to imagine they could be very successful w/o doing all they could to avoid fooling themselves. Unless they were studying self deception and using themselves as test subjects... Lol.Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-68311831859855310502016-01-10T10:46:06.180-08:002016-01-10T10:46:06.180-08:00https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scalar_field
The Hi...<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scalar_field" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scalar_field</a><br /><br />The Higgs is a scalar field (spin-0). If it is fundamental (not composite or like a string excitation) the sum of Feynman diagrams for the mass are infinite, requiring a new scale (set by strings or some other field) to regularize (i.e. make not-infinite).Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-61283691190403637082016-01-10T10:41:11.109-08:002016-01-10T10:41:11.109-08:00I love the post and the discussion!... though I do...I love the post and the discussion!... though I don't understand it all (e.g. I have no idea what a fundamental scalar field is, and what that has to do with the Higgs boson... but that doesn't bother me too much).Tom Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654184190478330946noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-6007094410341010992016-01-10T10:20:26.188-08:002016-01-10T10:20:26.188-08:00Both of those examples represent cases of scope (t...Both of those examples represent cases of scope (the realm of empirical validity), and have nothing to do with Popper's falsification. Newton's law of gravity is an approximation to general relativity -- it is true under certain scope conditions.<br /><br />If Neptune had never been discovered, you would have some other possible theory (such as "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modified_Newtonian_dynamics" rel="nofollow">MOND</a>", which is also falsifiable) to which Newton's law would be an approximation.<br /><br />I think a good way to think about falsifiability is that it has nothing to do with "being falsified" or "not being falsified". It is about whether there exist states of the universe that aren't allowed by the theory.<br /><br />Once you are questioning scope of a theory (applying to Neptune or Mercury), you've answered that the theory is falsifiable and are now just considering empirical accuracy.<br /><br />The orbit of mercury was proposed to be perturbed by the motion of another planet called "Vulcan" at the time to explain the precession.<br /><br />Here's another way to think about it. Since discovering the Higgs boson we are now presented with a major problem. There cannot be fundamental scalar fields because their mass is renormalized to infinity. So the Higgs boson was both a major success of the standard model and falsified the theory.<br /><br />That doesn't make sense. It's better to say the Higgs was a success and helped determine the scope of the theory (setting a scale for unified theories).<br /><br />The standard model has long been a falsifiable theory --there were fears that the Higgs might not be found!Jason Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12680061127040420047noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6837159629100463303.post-47182873172572044952016-01-10T09:09:12.506-08:002016-01-10T09:09:12.506-08:00Falsification goes along with faute de mieux. Supp...Falsification goes along with faute de mieux. Suppose that Neptune had not been discovered, even though the most likely places for its position had been searched. That would have left the anomalies in the orbit of Uranus unexplained. Astronomers would have known that Newton's universal law of gravity might not be so universal. I.e., it would have been at least provisionally falsified. Falsification is fuzzy.<br /><br />Of more concern were the anomalies in the orbit of Mercury. Can we say that Newton's law of gravity was truly falsified before Einstein came up with a better one? One which explained the orbit of Mercury.<br /><br />As for induction, which has made something of a comeback, at least in machine learning, Holland points out that there is often a problem of coming up with any theory at all. ;) That applies to falsification, as well. If Newton's law of gravity did not apply, what did?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com